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John M. Abowd, Cornell University and NBER
Chemin and Wasmer attempt the first evaluation, to my knowledge, of
French labor market interventions using the technique known as re-
gional difference-in-differences, first popularized in labor economics by
Ashenfelter(1978)andnowoneoftheworkhorsesofempiricallaboreco-
nomics. Their paper uses regional variation in labor market institutions,
long thought to be nonexistent in France, to make a first pass at evaluat-
ingthreeinterventions:the1989welfarelawthat established aminimum
income for individuals above age 25 regardless of employment status
(Revenu Minimum d’Insertion), the 1978 changes to the national sick leave
policy (indemnisation complémentaire), and the 1998–2000 phase-in of the
French 35-hour workweek (réduction du temps de travail). My discussion
will focus on the last of these experiments because it was the one that mo-
tivated the present paper and because the authors' other work indicates
that they have studied this intervention more carefully than the first two.
In each case, the preliminary evaluation, which is all they provide in
this paper, makes use of institutional differences in the Alsace-Moselle
region of France (technically a political region, Alsace, and a political
département, Moselle). This region has been (infamously) disputed be-
tween France and Germany and was last subject to German national
law from 1870 to 1918. As a vestige of this era, the political entities (dé-
partements) within Alsace-Moselle retain as local law some of the original
German laws. Essentially, whenever the historical German laws were
more generous than the prevailing French national laws, the Alsace-
Moselle region was permitted to retain the more generous provisions.
This regional variation provides the setting for the authors’ difference-
in-difference evaluation of the three interventions. As French national
laws became more generous over time, they created changes in the rest
of the country that did not occur as sharply in Alsace-Moselle because in
that region the applicable laws were already more generous.
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massive labor market intervention orchestrated over more than 5 years
and involving mandates, subsidies, and cajoling of major employers
and unions. It was one of the most pervasive policies aimed at the labor
market by any developed economy since the Thatcher reforms of the
British labor markets. And it appears to have been a colossal failure,
at least in its stated goal of inducing French employers to hire more
employees and work each one less intensively.
Kramarz et al. (2008) performed a very thorough evaluation of the
phased implementation of the Aubry laws over the period 1997–2005,
focusing on outcomes at the establishment level. They stress the follow-
ing conclusion:
In the short run, firms that went to thirty-five hours benefited from the
policy, in particular low-productivity firms (because payroll tax subsi-
dies were disproportionately directed to them) to the detriment of
firms that stayed at thirty-nine hours. Hence, in the short run, employ-
ment was redirected to low-productivity firms adopting the policy.
Then, in the medium run, the breath of air coming from the subsidies
stopped working and the firms that had moved to thirty-five hours
started to fail massively, while the survivors appear to have benefited
from these deaths. (171)
In their longer paper, Chemin and Wasmer (2008) use the regional
variation in Alsace-Moselle to identify the incremental effect of a 10%
change in the mandatory hours/fixed-wage regime. Their first step is to
verify that this region actually experienced a 10% less effective change,
at least over the period 1998–2000. This 10% difference arises from the
fact that two additional annual holidays were accorded to workers in
Alsace-Moselle by the German laws but were not accorded to other
French workers, including those in nearby Lorraine. When the Aubry
laws were first enforced, employers in Alsace-Moselle counted these
two days as “already-implemented” hours reductions. Hence, the
Aubry laws were less effective (by 10%) in this region. In 2003, French
courts disallowed this interpretation and restored the historical privi-
lege of two additional paid vacation days accorded to Alsace-Moselle
by the vestigial German laws.
The second step of the Chemin and Wasmer difference-in-difference
evaluation is to estimate the incremental effect of the workweek regime
change on employment and unemployment (only unemployment is
discussed in the present paper). They hypothesize that the contrast be-
tween Alsace-Moselle and the rest of France will show that the laws
were less effective in Alsace-Moselle. In the present paper, the results
Comment 307for unemployment are implausibly large and have the opposite sign of
what was predicted. The authors assert that they needed to refine their
control group, effectively using difference-in-difference-in-difference es-
timates. This is precisely what they have done in the longer paper,
where they find that the new workweek regime was associated with
a reduction in hours that was 0.38 (+/−0.17) hour per week less effec-
tive, almost exactly the 0.4 hour less effective (10% of 4 hours per week)
thattheypredicted.Havingvalidatedtheirquasi-experimentaldesign, they
compute triple-difference estimates of the effects on employment. Their
statistical analysis withstands multiple validity experiments (control
groups): firm size (<20 treated differently by the law), sector (some col-
lective bargaining agreements were less protective), and occupation
(self-employed not affected). The authors conclude that the case for in-
creased employment/decreased unemployment from the full regime is
questionable.Iagree but note that the estimatedemployment and unem-
ployment effects in the longer paper had the correct sign and were suffi-
ciently imprecise to admit of ambiguity.
What is the best strategy to estimate the effect of the 39- to 35-hour
workweek reduction? That is still not clear. Although the standard mi-
croeconometric technique of difference-in-differences can be applied to
individuals, as in the present paper and the authors’ longer paper cited
above, this is not the only source of evidence. Kramarz et al. apply the
methodology to firms, where they find the results quoted earlier.
Furthermore, mandatory hours reductions coupled with mandatory
wage increases leaving earnings unchanged provide a strong incentive
to substitute more productive (higher-wage) individuals for less pro-
ductive (lower-wage) workers. This is what happened in France in
the Mitterrand era workweek reduction from 40 to 39 hours (Crépon
and Kramarz 2002). This appears to be what has happened with the
Aubry laws. National productivity/hour statistics confirm the increase
in productivity and the nonincrease in employment.
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